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NOTES
The Supreme Court Attempts to "Iron Out" the Wrinkles in
National Starch
One of the most anxious experiences in the life of any tax practitioner or tax
attorney is waiting for the United States Supreme Court to rule on a controversial
tax issue. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner (formerly National Starch & Chemical
Corp. v. Commissioner)' is one of the Court's most recent decisions in the tax
area. This decision signals a change in the test for determining the deductibility
of expenditures.2 Indopco has resulted in confusion for taxpayers and tax
attorneys, who are unsure what test applies to determine the deductibility of
expenditures. As a result of the broad test announced by the Court, the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) may attempt to alter business behavior by disallowing
current expense deductions for items which were once deductible, but may now
have to be capitalized in light of Jndopco.3 These items include both takeover
and non-takeover related expenses, such as repairs, advertising, start-up CoSts,
4
and hazardous waste removal costs.5
This casenote outlines the events in the corporate takeover area which
preceded Indopco, and includes an analysis of the decisions and alternative
rulings which the Supreme Court could have used to reach the same result in
lndopco. Although Indopco results in unfavorable tax treatment for the taxpayer,
it is the Court's broad holding and lack of adherence to the stare decisis doctrine
that is problematic. This casenote also discusses the decision's potential impact
in both takeover and non-takeover related areas, in addition to how the ruling in
lndopco should be limited in future decisions.
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67 (1989), affid, 918 F.2d 426
(3d Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
2. The previous test followed by the Court had been established in Commissioner v. Lincoln
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 91 S. Ct. 1893 (1971).
3. See Robert A. Rizzi, Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations, 17 J. Corp. Tax'n 169
(1990). See generally Paul D. Manca, Note, Deductibility of Takeover and Non-Takeover Expenses
in the Wake of lndopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 45 Tax Law. 815 (1992).
4. I.R.C. § 195(c)(1) (1988) defines start-up expenditures as amounts:
(A) paid or incurred in connection with (i) investigating the creation or acquisition of an
active trade or business, or (ii) creating an active trade or business, or (iii) any activity
engaged in for profit and for production of income before the date on which the active
trade or business begins, in anticipation of such activity becoming an active trade or
business, and .
(B) which, if paid or incurred in connection with the operation of an existing active trade
or business (in the same field as the trade or business referred to in subparagraph (A)),
would be allowable as a deduction for the taxable year in which paid or incurred.
5. For purposes of this casenote, the primary focus will be on these particular areas. However,
the Indopco decision could potentially impact many other tax areas, and this will be discussed
generally.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
I. INDOPCO, INC. V. COMMISSIONER
In Indopco the Supreme Court addressed the deductibility of expenditures
that National Starch incurred during a friendly takeover, which transformed it
from a publicly-held corporation to a wholly owned subsidiary. 6 To resolve this
matter, the Court had to unravel the conflict among the circuits concerning the
differing interpretations of its ruling in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan
Ass'n.7
In October 1977, Unilever Corporation expressed an interest in acquiring
National Starch, one of its suppliers. Because National Starch's two largest
shareholders were concerned about the estate tax implications of the takeover;6
the directors requested a private letter ruling from the Service. The Service
subsequently issued a ruling that the transaction would be tax-free.9  The
director's counsel also informed them that under Delaware law the directors
owed a fiduciary duty to their shareholders to ensure that the proposed
transaction would be fair. Therefore, Morgan Stanley & Co., an investment
banking firm, was engaged to evaluate the stock and to issue a fairness opinion.
National Starch incurred the following expenditures during this period: (1)
Morgan Stanley charged National Starch $2,200,000 in fees, plus $7,586 for out-
of-pocket expenses and $18,000 for legal fees; (2) counsel charged $490,000 in
fees, plus $15,069 for out-of-pocket expenses; and (3) $150,962 in miscellaneous
expenses-accounting, printing, proxy solicitation, and S.E.C. fees. During the
6. 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992). The National Starch & Chemical Corporation became Indopco
after the ownership of National Starch was transferred to Unilever pursuant to a friendly takeover.
Id. at 1041.
7. 403 U.S. 345, 91 S. Ct. 1893 (1974). See also infra notes 54-76 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the conflict among the circuits prior to the Indopco decision.
8. Frank Greenwall, 81 years old, and his wife, 79 years old, were the largest shareholders of
National Starch, owning 14.5% of the outstanding shares. In the agreement with Unilever, the
Greenwalls agreed to voluntarily dispose of their stock holdings only if the transaction would be tax-
free. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 69 (1989). By deferring any
potential capital gain from this transaction, the Greenwalls' appreciation in their stock would escape
income tax upon their deaths through section 1014, which provides for a stepped-up basis in the
assets of the deceased to the fair market value on the date of death (assuming no alternate valuation
date). Although no income tax on this appreciated stock would be assessed to the Greenwalls upon
their deaths, the fair market value of the stock would be inclusible in their gross estates for estate tax
purposes. I.R.C. § 1014 (1988).
9. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-39-060 (June 28, 1978). The transaction obtained tax-free status through
section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code. The acquisition of National Starch by Unilever was
effectuated by the formation of a new subsidiary, which was to be controlled by Unilever.
Approximately 79% of the National Starch shareholders who desired cash for their stock contributed
their National Starch stock to the subsidiary in return for $380 million in cash. The remaining
shareholders who wanted to avoid tax on the gain realized received $97 million in nonvoting,
nonmarketable preferred stock of the newly-formed subsidiary in exchange for the National Starch
stock. See Calvin Johnson, The Expenditures Incurred by the Target Corporation in an Acquisitive
Reorganization are Dividends to the Shareholders: (Pssst, Don't Tell the Supreme Court), 53 Tax
Notes 463, 465 (October 28, 1991).
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audit of National Starch's 1978 federal tax return, the Service disallowed a
deduction for these expenses. 0 The Tax Court held that the expenditures were
not deductible under Internal Revenue Code section 162(a) because of the future
benefits the expenditures would generate, and the Third Circuit affirmed."
The Supreme Court began its reasoning by discussing a few tax axioms: the
issue of deductibility versus capitalization concerns the timing of the cost
recovery for the expenditure; the Internal Revenue Code attempts to match
expenses with the accompanying revenues; and "an income tax deduction is a
matter of legislative grace and ... the burden of clearly showing the right to the
claimed deduction is on the taxpayer."' 3  National Starch argued that the
expenditures incurred in its transaction with Unilever should be deductible
because they did not result in the "creation or enhancement of an asset," the test
for deductibility established by the Court in Lincoln Savings.'4 The Indopco
opinion rejected National Starch's contention that the "creation or enhancement
of an asset" was a prerequisite to capitalization and concluded that National
Starch had "overread" Lincoln Savings.5
In short, Lincoln Savings holds that the creation of a separate and
distinct asset well may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition to
classification as a capital expenditure....
Nor does our statement in Lincoln Savings that "the presence of an
ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not controlling"
prohibit reliance on future benefit as a means of distinguishing an
ordinary business expense from a capital expenditure. 6
After establishing and applying the tax principles relevant to this particular
case, the Court affirmed the lower courts in holding that National Starch had
"not demonstrated that the ... costs it incurred in connection with Unilever's
acquisition of its shares are deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses under § 162(a)." 7 The Court further stated that the facts in the record
10. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 72 (1989).
11. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 434 (3d Cir. 1990). See
infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the Tax Court and Third Circuit
decisions. See generally Johnson, supra note 9, at 463 (explaining that when a company pays
shareholder expenses like those incurred in Indopco, or when the benefit is primarily for the
shareholders in their individual capacity, the payments should be treated as dividends).
12. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct..1039, 1042 (1992).
13. Id. at 1043 (quoting inter alia Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593,
63 S. Ct. 1279, 1281 (1943)). But see generally Erwin N. Griswold, An Argument Against the
Doctrine that Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace. 56 Harv.
L. Rev. 1142, 1143-47 (1943) (discussing the origin of this jurisprudential rule of interpretation).
14. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044.
15. Id.
16. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354, 91 S. Ct. 1893, 1899 (1971)).
17. Id. at 1045.
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supported the conclusion that the benefits accruing to National Starch extended
beyond the tax year. Additionally, the Court cited cases and commentators that
classified expenses incurred in reorganizing or restructuring the corporate entity
as nondeductible and explained that "[t]he rationale behind these decisions
applies equally to the professional charges at issue in this case."' 8 The Court
held that whether the expenditures created or enhanced a separate and distinct
additional asset was "not controlling" and that the "acquisition-related expenses
bear the indicia of capital expenditures and are to be treated as such."' 9
II. BACKGROUND PRECEDING THE INDOPCO DECISION
A. Current Expenses vs. Capital Expenditures"
One of the most fundamental concepts in taxation is that current expenses
are deductible in the year incurred, while costs incurred in acquiring a capital
asset are nondeductible capital expenditures and are generally ratably depreciated
or amortized over the useful life of the asset.2' Deducting expenses currently
from income produces immediate tax benefits to taxpayers, while capital
expenditures result in the deferral of tax benefits. By matching these costs with
the future income they generate, taxpayers therefore report both income and
deductions by a method which more accurately reflects their "true" income.2
18. Id. at 1046.
19. Id.
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4)(ii) (1978) states that "[e]xpenditures made during the year shall
be properly classified as between capital and expense. For example, expenditures for such items as
plant and equipment, which have a useful life extending substantially beyond the taxable year, shall
be charged to a capital account and not to an expense account."
21. The time value of money dictates that a taxable business would rather have a deductible
expense today, rather than capitalize the expenditure (and later recover the costs ratably over its
useful life through depreciation or amortization deductions which may offset future income-the
matching principle). Absent other circumstances, income-producing businesses would rather obtain
tax savings in the form of current expense deductions today and invest the savings immediately,
rather than deferring the tax benefit of recovering the costs of the capital expenditures over several
tax years. "This deferral is the equivalent of an interest-free loan from the government, the economic
benefits of which can be very significant." John W. Lee & Nina R. Murphy, Capital Expenditures:
A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 474 n.10 (1981) (quoting Staff of the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Tax Shelters 6 (1976)).
Capital expenditures may be depreciated or amortized if allowed by the Internal Revenue Code.
For example, section 167 allows as a depreciation deduction "a reasonable allowance for the
exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) (1) of property used
in the trade or business, or (2) of property held for the production of income." I.R.C. § 167(a)
(1988). Section 195, as defined in supra note 4, allows stch deferred expenses to be a "deduction
prorated equally over such period of not less than 60 months as may be selected by the taxpayer
(beginning with the month in which the active trade or business begins)." I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1988).
22. The matching principle is fundamental to both tax and financial accounting. "Mismatching
is a sin of tax accounting, as much as it is in financial accounting." See Johnson, supra note 9, at
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Although these concepts are easily applied mathematically given the amount
of the expenditure, the difficulty lies in determining when to apply each of the
two concepts: "neither [the] courts nor the accounting profession have devised
a universal, foolproof method of distinguishing current expenses from capital
costs."23 Consequently, the question of whether an expense may be deducted
or must be capitalized continues to be an area of major litigation between the
taxpayers and the Service.24
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business."25 Under the Court's earlier test, an expense
is deductible under section 162(a) if: (1) it is paid or incurred during the taxable
year, (2) for carrying on any trade or business, and (3) is an expense (4) that is
both necessary and (5) ordinary.26 The term "necessary," as interpreted by the
courts, implies "only the minimal requirement that the expense be appropriate
and helpful for the development of the [taxpayer's] business.2 7  To be
"ordinary," the expense must relate to a transaction "of common or frequent
occurrence in the type of business involved." 2s Courts typically focus on the
473; Alan Gunn, The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C.
Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. 443, 452-54 (1974). I.R.C. § 446(b) requires the taxpayer to use a method
of accounting which "clearly reflect[s] income."
Also, Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1967) provides that "[i]f an expenditure results in the creation
of an asset having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable year, such
an expenditure may not be deductible, or may be deductible only in part, for the taxable year in
which made." This does not mean that capitalization issues are always to be decided upon whether
"capitalization is necessary in order to clearly reflect income." However, this regulation should be
applicable at least when an expenditure creates an asset. See Gunn, supra, at 452-53.
23. NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 1982). Compare Zimmern v.
Commissioner, 28 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1928) (taxpayer was allowed a business expense deduction for
refurbishing a sunken barge) with P. Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1946)
(taxpayer required to capitalize the costs of rebuilding the stem of barge that had rotted). To help
understand these cases, consider that the deductible expense was allowed because of the sudden loss
caused by the storm, while the costs incurred to repair the damaged barge caused by gradual
deterioration were capitalized.
One of the most well-known answers to this elusive question was offered by Justice Cardozo:
"The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its
fullness must supply the answer to the riddle." Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115, 54 S. Ct. 8,
9 (1933).
24. See Thomas F. Quinn, Takeover Expenses Incurred by the Acquired Corporation-Not Just
Another Ordinary Deduction, 10 J.L. & Com. 167, 168 (1990).
25. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988).
26. Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352, 91 S. Ct. 1893, 1898
(1971).
27. lndopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1044'(1992) (quoting Welch, 290 U.S. at
113, 54 S. Ct. at 8).
28. Id. (quoting Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 496, 60 S. Ct. 363, 367 (1940)).
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term "ordinary" to assist practitioners in determining whether costs are currently
deductible or constitute a capital expenditure.29
Section 162(a) must be read in pari materia with section 263(a)(1), which
disallows a deduction for "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any
property or estate. 'a  Thus, business expenditures which do not qualify as
currently deductible under the section 162(a) test, notwithstanding that they may
be deductible under some other code provision, are generally treated as capital
expenditures under section 263(a)." "The purpose of § 263 is to reflect the
basic principle that a capital expenditure may not be deducted from current
income. It serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction
properly attributable ... to later tax years when the capital asset becomes
income producing. 32  Although capitalized, generally all of the cost of the
capital expenditures will be deductible through depreciation or amortization if
some provision of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the deduction.3
Nevertheless, while some intangible assets with a determinable useful life,
such as patents and copyrights, may be amortized, other intangibles which have
no determinable useful life, such as goodwill, may not be depreciated or
amortized. Therefore, as a practical matter, capital expenditure items which
are not deductible through depreciation or amortization have little, if any, tax
value to the taxpayer.35 Thus, even if in-house accountants follow generally
accepted accounting principles by deducting the cost of an item on its books,
which under section 263(a) was required to be capitalized, the business entity
will still receive no tax benefit from this accounting entry, 6 In this event, a tax
29. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90. 86 S. Ct. 1118, 1119-20 (1966).
30. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (1988).
31. Section 263 is used as a heading under which to place the capital expenditure cases.
Nevertheless, section 263 is both too narrow and too broad to satisfactorily explain all of the
capitalization requirements: That section is both too narrow and too broad to explain satisfactorily
all capitalization requirements-"[T]oo narrow because its reference to 'new buildings or ...
permanent improvements' suggests that capitalization is limited to the costs of new, tangible property,
which is clearly not the case; too broad because there are costs, such as those for some repairs, which
are represented by permanent improvements but which have always been considered deductible."
Gunn, supra note 22. at 448 (footnote omitted).
32. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16, 94 S. Ct. 2757, 2766 (1974).
33. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167, 168, 195 (1988).
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3, 25 Fed. Reg. 11402 (1960).
35. Capital expenditures which have no statute authorizing depreciation or amortization
deductions generate no current tax benefit to the taxpayer. For example, the expenditures incurred
in Jndopco fall within this category "because the benefit to the company has no ascertainable useful
life." National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426,434 (3d Cir. 1990). However,
these expenditures may be added to the bpsis of the acquired asset and generate tax benefits in the
year of disposition by offsetting the later gain on the sale of the asset.
36. See Quinn, supra note 24, at 170. The increase in tax basis of assets resulting from
capitalization helps to reduce the subsequent tax gain on the sale. As a practical matter, it may be
more efficient for large corporations to separate their tax and general accounting ledgers.
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adjusting entry will be required to convert the corporation's accounting book net
income to taxable income.
B. Takeover Expenses Before Indopco
During the 1980s the financial world experienced a flurry of corporate
takeovers, mergers, and acquisitions.37 Due to the increased frequency of these
transactions and their resulting exorbitant costs, the tax treatment of these items
became of great importance to taxpayers.38 Not surprisingly, the Service was
close behind, offering guidance to taxpayers on how to report these complex
transactions. Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM)39 85-16-002 issued
December 14, 1984, focused on the issue of whether expenses incurred by a
corporation in opposing an unsuccessful stock tender offer were deductible
business expenses under section 162(a) or nondeductible expenditures for the
benefit of the shareholders. In this TAM, the Service ruled that the litigation
costs incurred by the defending corporation in resisting the tender offer were
currently deductible-a ruling consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions.4
Additionally, the investment banking expenses incurred by the defending
corporation in trying to find a "white knight"'" were only conditionally
deductible in the year of abandonment of the plan, contrary to the general rule
that reorganizational expenses were capital expenditures.42 Also, the expenses
incurred by the corporation in appealing to its stockholders to oppose the tender
offer were held to be deductible, since these expenses were analogous to
deductible proxy expenses.4
Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, the Service issued TAM 89-27-005,
which addressed the deductibility of expenses incurred in successfully resisting
37. See id. at 167. Hostile takeovers became the most popular means of acquiring target
corporations in the 1980s. See Rizzi, supra note 3, at 169.
38. See Mark B. Persellin, Takeover Defense Expenditures: Deductibility Not Necessarily
Precluded by National Starch, 42 Tax. Exec. 159 (1990). One of the reasons the government sought
certiorari was because the Internal Revenue Service had sixty-seven pending cases involving about
$547 million in tax liabilities concerning mergers and acquisitions. See Manca, supra note 3, at 815
n.6.
39. TAM's are I.R.S. weekly releases from the National Office to its field personnel, and they
offer the Service's determination of an issue encountered during an audit. TAM's are binding on the
district or Appeals Office level that requested the advice, if the outcome is favorable to the taxpayer.
However, if the outcome is unfavorable to the taxpayer, the TAM's are not binding on the Appeals
Office. Michael 1. Saltzman, I.R.S. Practice and Procedure, I 3.04[2][d] (2d ed. 1991).
40. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-16-002 (Dec. 14, 1984). The TAM was referring to Commission-
er v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 86 S. Ct. 1118 (1965) and Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 64
S. Ct. 249 (1943).
41. The primary purpose of searching for a "white knight" is for the target corporation to be
acquired by a friendly corporation to prevent future hostile attacks. See Manca, supra note 3, at 820-
21; Rizzi, supra note 3. at 169.
42. See Rev. Rul. 67-125, 1967-1 C.B. 31.
43. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-16-002 (Dec. 14, 1984).
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a hostile takeover, in addition to successfully locating a "white knight" purchaser.
In ruling that the expenditures were deductible, the Service applied the "origin
and character of the claim" test' and the rationale from TAM 85-16-002. The
"ordinary and necessary" expenditures pertained to carrying on a trade or
business because the board of directors had a fiduciary responsibility to oppose
tender offers that were detrimental to its corporation. Furthermore, the
expenditures were not subject to the general rule of capitalization for
reorganizational costs45 because the costs were not incurred pursuant to an
alteration in the capital structure of the corporation. To the contrary, the costs
were incurred in furtherance of the directors' fiduciary duty to resist tender offers
not beneficial to the corporation. The Service stated: "We do not believe that
section 263(a) of the Code applies to the expenses incurred by X because the
Directors of X were attempting to insure the continued profitability of the
business and to protect the interests of the shareholders .... 946
The Tax Court reversed this trend in the takeover area when it decided
National Starch & Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue47
(which involved a friendly takeover) on July 24, 1989. The Tax Court concluded
that the fulfillment of a fiduciary duty in this case was not controlling. Instead,
the court held that the expenses incurred were to be capitalized because the
"directors determined that it would be in petitioner's long-term interest to shift
ownership of the corporate stock. 48 One week later, in light of this new Tax
Court decision supporting a more favorable outcome for the government, the
Service revoked TAM 89-27-005 by issuing TAM 89-45-003. 4 9 To explain this
revocation, the Service simply stated:
The court's reasoning [in National Starch] applies with equal force in
the case of a hostile takeover that is successfully resisted by locating a
white knight. There is no less a long term benefit to the target of the
hostile takeover in this situation than there is to the target of a friendly
takeover as in the National Starch case.5"
Subsequently, on July 9, 1990, the Service issued TAM 90-43-003, which
was a detailed analysis for its revocation of TAM 89-27-005 in light of National
44. "It is 'the origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred,
rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, [which) is the controlling
basic test ....' Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989) (quoting United States v. Gilmore,
372 U.S. 39, 49, 83 S. Ct. 623, 629 (1963)).
45. See Boris I. Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 5.06, at 5-36 (5th ed. 1987).
46. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-27-005 (Mar. 27, 1989) (making no reference to the rule stated in
Lincoln Savings as a basis for rejecting the capitalization of the expenses).
47. 93 T.C. 67 (1989).
48. Id. at 75.




Starch.5  The Service concluded on reconsideration: (1) generally, expenses
incurred by a corporation directly related to the resistance of a hostile takeover
were deductible under section 162; and (2) expenses incurred to find a white
knight and to facilitate either a merger or sale of the stock of the target
corporation were to be capitalized because they create a long-term benefit to the
corporation.52 In essence, the Service stated that the deductibility of the
expenses incurred during the transaction would be determined based upon the
corporation's purpose for incurring such costs. TAM 91-44-042 also concluded
that the nature of the takeover, whether friendly or hostile, was "not determina-
tive of the proper tax treatment afforded to expenditures for professional
fees .... Each case will turn on its own specific set of facts and circumstanc-
es."
53
C. Conflict in the Circuits over Lincoln Savings
The foregoing discussion focused on the pre-Indopco deductibility of
expenses under section 162 in the corporate takeover area, the same type of
expenses litigated in Indopco. However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Indopco not only because of the confusion surrounding the deductibility of
takeover-related expenses under section 162(a), but more importantly because of
the conflict among the federal circuits in applying the section 162(a) deductibility
test as set forth in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association.54
In Lincoln Savings, the Court was faced with the question of whether
additional compulsory premiums paid by a state-chartered savings and loan
association to the Federal Saving & Loan Insurance Corporation ("F.S.L.I.C.")
were deductible under section 162(a). These payments were made to a
Secondary Reserve that paid only those losses not covered by the F.S.L.I.C. The
Court held that three out of the five requirements under section 162(a) were met,
namely that the premiums were (1) paid or incurred in the taxable year, (2) made
in carrying on a trade or business, and (3) necessary because the payment was
51. Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
52. Id.
53. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (July 1, 1991). See Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner,
99 T.C. 648 (1992), where the taxpayer argued that the expenditures should be deductible because
they were incurred in a hostile takeover. In this case, the taxpayer, the target corporation, incurred
over $500,000 in professional fees paid to lawyers and investment bankers for consulting and a
fairness opinion. Although Victory's Board of Directors adopted a "poison pill" plan (i.e., offering
stock rights to existing corporate shareholders to purchase its stock at a substantial discount to ward
off a hostile takeover), this plan was never effectuated. The acquiring corporation, LNC, stated that
it was prepared to take its offer directly to Victory's shareholders but did not actually do so.
Victory's directors also made an effort to locate a white knight before it finally accepted LNC's offer.
The Tax Court found that the takeover was "friendly," rather than "hostile," as the taxpayer argued.
Also, because the facts in the case were generally not distinguishable from hidopco, the court did not
consider whether Indopco would apply to hostile takeovers.
54. 403 U.S. 345, 91 S. Ct. 1893 (1971).
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compelled by the provisions of the National Housing Act.55 The two remaining
requirements, (4) that the payment be an "expense" and (5) be "ordinary" within
the meaning of section 162(a), were in doubt.5 6 Lincoln Savings argued that
the possibility of a future benefit from the payment did not necessarily make the
payment capital in nature." Holding that the premium payment was not
deductible under section 162(a), the Court stated:
[T]he presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect
is not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospec-
tive effect beyond the taxable year.
What is important and controlling, we feel, is that the ... payment
serves to create or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate
and distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable consequence, the
payment is capital in nature and not an expense, let alone an ordinary
expense, deductible under § 162(a) .... "
Thus, to determine whether the premium payment was a capital expense, the
Court focused on whether a "separate and distinct additional asset" was created,
rather than determining whether future benefits existed. The Court further
emphasized that whether a payment is compulsory "does not in and of itself
make that payment an ordinary and necessary expense within the meaning of §
162(a)."59
Some courts have interpreted this language from Lincoln Savings, requiring
that the expenditure result in a "separate and distinct additional asset," as a
prerequisite to capitalization. In Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comnissioner,60 the
Second Circuit considered the deductibility of payments incurred to create a
wholesale franchise division by soliciting drugstores to act as retail sellers of its
product. The Tax Court held that the expenditures (mostly travel, promotions,
and advertising) were capital because their benefits (revenues) extended beyond
55. Id. at 354, 91 S. Ct. at 1899.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added). Before the Lincoln Savings decision, the converse of this rule was
well-established--expenditures which did not create or enhance an asset were currently deductible,
even though they were related to income for future years. This clear statement by the Supreme Court
increased the attention given to the search for assets in capitalization cases. See Gunn, supra note
22, at 444-45.
59. Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 359, 91 S. Ct. at 1901. It is interesting to note that in
countering the government's argument that Lincoln Savings would receive future benefits from the
premium payments, Justice Douglas stated, in dissent, that these payments are "not used for losses,
and will never be used except in the event of a national catastrophe." Id. at 361, 91 S. Ct. at 1902
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Ironically, this is the same Lincoln Savings and Loan
whose insolvency and scandals in the wake of a "national catastrophe" figures to cost the taxpayers
(at the latest figures) approximately $2.5 billion. Lee A. Sheppard, National Starch Decision Fails
to Remove Wrinkles from Capital Expense Issue, 44 Tax Notes 652, 653 (August 7, 1989).
60. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
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the year in which they were incurred.6' The Second Circuit held that these
expenditures for the protection of the taxpayer's existing business, by expanding
into a new geographic territory, were deductible expenses. 62  The Second
Circuit reasoned that the effect of the payments was no different from what
commission-paid salesmen would have achieved, which clearly would have been
deductible under section 162.63 Furthermore, the court cited Lincoln Savings
and offered the following commentary: "[Lincoln Savings] has brought about
a radical shift in emphasis and directs the inquiry ... to the question whether
... [the taxpayer] 'created or enhanced for [itself]... essentially a separate and
distinct additional asset." '64
Noting that the corporation in the instant case had not acquired any "new
separate and distinct additional asset in these agreements," 65 the court found that
the decision of the Tax Court was manifestly wrong. Consequently, the court
read the "controlling" language in Lincoln Savings to require the presence of a
"separate and distinct additional asset" before the expenditure must be capital-
ized.' A literal interpretation of Lincoln Savings would mandate that absent
a "separate and distinct additional asset," the expenditures should not be
capitalized. Although the Court in Lincoln Savings did not specifically discuss
deductibility in cases involving no "separate and distinct additional asset," later
courts, including the Briarcliff court, held that the presence of such an asset is
a prerequisite to capitalization.67
61. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 171 (1972).
62. Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 787.
63. Id. at 783.
64. Id. at 782.
65. Id. at 787.
66. The Briarcliff court probably overstated the significance of this language in Lincoln
Savings. 1 Boris 1. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts. 1
20.4.4, at 20-84 n.61 (2d ed. 1990).
67. See Central Texas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1184 (5th Cir. 1984)
(stating that "[the] question, therefore, is whether [it] create[d] a separate and distinct additional asset"
in capitalizing the costs incurred in starting up new branches). But see NCNB Corp. v. United States,
684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (allowing current deductions for the costs expended in locating new
locations and feasibility studies).
Also, in Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974), the bank
sought to currently deduct the expenses incurred in participating in a new charge card system. The
court adopted the rationale of Briarcliff in allowing the deduction because the bank's expenditures
did not create a separate asset:
The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a property interest. They
produced nothing corporeal or salable. They are recurring. At the most they introduced
a more efficient method of conducting an old business. The government suggests no way
in which they could be amortized. The government's theoretical approach ignores the
practicalities of the situation, and permits a distortion of taxpayer's financial situation.
If an expenditure, concededly of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized,
the adoption of technological advances is discouraged.
Id., at 1192. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050 (9th
Cir. 1979), adopted the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Colorado Springs.
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This interpretation of the Lincoln Savings rule was at issue when the Third
Circuit heard the appeal from the Tax Court's decision in National Starch.68
In the Tax Court, National Starch argued that because no "separate and distinct
additional asset" was created, the bright-line test of Lincoln Savings applied and
the costs consequently should be deductible. 69  Despite National Starch's
argument, the Tax Court decided that given the absence of a "separate and
distinct additional asset" in this case, the Lincoln Savings test was inapplica-
ble.70 Because no other acceptable theory of capitalization (i.e., recapitalization,
merger, or reorganization) applied to National Starch, the Tax Court created a
different test.7 Accordingly, the Tax Court required the expenditures incurred
by National Starch to be capitalized because "petitioner's directors determined
that [the expenditures] would be in petitioner's long-term interest. ' '72
On appeal to the Third Circuit, National Starch argued that the Tax Court's
approval of the future benefit test was specifically rejected by the Court in
Lincoln Savings and that Lincoln Savings had established a "new and exclusive
test for distinguishing between deductible expenses and nondeductible capital
expenditures under which expenses are not to be capitalized unless they result
in the creation or enhancement of a separate and distinct asset." 73  National
Starch reasoned that if the expenditures did not result in the creation of a
"separate and distinct asset," then that was the end of the inquiry-the
expenditures would be deductible under Lincoln Savings.74 In other words,
National Starch contended that the presence of a "separate and distinct asset" was
a condition precedent to requiring the capitalization of expenditures. The Third
Circuit, in affirming the Tax Court, concluded that no single factor should
control this complex issue and that the lack of a Lincoln Savings asset alone did
not necessarily ensure that an expenditure would be an "ordinary and necessary"
One of the most concise explanations of Lincoln Savings and the one-year rule was stated in Nagy
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1326, 1328 (1978), where the Tax Court stated, "[T]he
controlling issue is whether the expenditure serves to create or enhance a separate and distinct asset
which lasts beyond the end of the taxable year." See Lee & Murphy, supra note 21, at 479-80;
Lynne A. Schewe et al., How to Establish Deductions for Friendly Takeover Costs by Limiting
National Starch, 74 J. Tax'n 146, 148 (1991).
68. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 428 (3d Cir. 1990).
69. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 77 (1989).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 76.
72. Id. (emphasis added). The Tax Court relied on cases prior to Lincoln Savings, such as E.I.
dupont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1059 (3d Cir. 1970); Falstaff Beer, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 744, 745-46 (5th Cir. 1963), affg 37 T.C. 451 (1961); McDonald v.
Commissioner, 139 F.2d 400, 401 (3d Cir. 1943), affd, 323 U.S. 57, 65 S. Ct. 96 (1944); and Clark
Thread Co. v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 257, 258 (3d Cir. 1938), affg 28 B.T.A. 1128 (1933).





deduction under section 162(a).75 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict among the circuits on this issue.
76
III. THE ERROR OF INDOPCO
Two major problems belie the Supreme Court's analysis in Indopco. First,
although courts can overturn their prior precedents when necessary, the Supreme
Court could have reached the same result in Indopco without ignoring the rule
of stare decisis. Second, the Court inconsistently relied on the facts of the case
as found by the Tax Court. The Tax Court found that the transaction did not
result in a reorganization;77 therefore, the Court should have followed this
finding of fact unless it was clearly erroneous. 78 In contrast, the Court gave
deference to the Tax Court's finding that National Starch actually did receive
long-term benefits from the transaction with Unilever.79
A. The Non-Application of Stare Decisis
In Lincoln Savings, Justice Blackmun stated that "the presence of an ensuing
benefit that may have some future benefit is not controlling."80 Roughly
twenty-one years later in Indopco, however, he noted that his statement in
Lincoln Savings did not "prohibit reliance on future benefit as a means of
distinguishing an ordinary business expense from a capital expenditure."'" How
could the Court change the test by relying on a factor today which the same
Court twenty-one years earlier had determined was not controlling?8 2 Under
a formal application of the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court should have been
bound by its earlier precedent in Lincoln Savings. Nevertheless, the Indopco
Court unequivocally resolved the conflict among the circuits by stating that
"National Starch has overread Lincoln Savings" and holding that the creation or
75. Id. at 431.
76. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1992).
77. See National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 428 (3d Cir. 1990)
("The Tax Court rejected the IRS' contention that the expenditures were nondeductible because they
were incurred incident to a recapitalization, merger, or reorganization, concluding essentially that the
form and structure of the transaction was (sic) selected primarily for administrative convenience.").
78. Id.
79. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1045 (1992).
80. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 403 U.S. 345, 354, 91 S. Ct. 1893, 1899
(1971) (emphasis added).
81. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044.
82. Justice Cardozo's statement in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115, 54 S. Ct. 8, 9
(1933), that the answer to the riddle is "a way of life," seems to foresee the changing concepts of
what factors should be considered in determining the deductibility of expenditures. He certainly did
not mean to suggest, however, that the rule should change with the vicissitudes of life. Notwithstand-
ing the stare decisis caveats, the potential tax liability implications of this retraction will have to be




enhancement of an asset was not a prerequisite to capitalization. 83 As the case
appears to have been ultimately decided on other grounds, it was not necessary
for the resolution of this issue for the Court to retract this problematic language
in Lincoln Savings.
Indopco could have been decided under the "origin of the claim" or
"dominant aspect" doctrine, in which expenditures from a transaction are
characterized by focusing on the origin or dominant aspect of the transaction.8 4
The Tax Court discussed the "dominant aspect" theory, but concluded that the
"dominant aspect" of the transaction was the transfer of the stock, not the
fiduciary duty of the directors as argued by National Starch. 5 If the directors'
fiduciary duty was the dominant aspect of the transaction, then arguably the
attributable expenditures should have been allowed as deductible expenses under
section 162.86 According to the Tax Court, the relevant facts indicated that
National Starch incurred the expenditures when its counsel advised the directors
of their fiduciary duty under Delaware law to examine the fairness of the
transaction. National Starch retained Morgan Stanley & Co. "primarily to value
the stock, to render a fairness opinion [generally pursuant to the directors'
fiduciary duty], and to stand ready to assist if there was a hostile tender
offer."87
By focusing on the "origin of the claim" and not the eventual results or
consequences of the expenditures, the Tax Court should have taken into account
that the obligations arising under a state law fiduciary duty were separate and
distinct from the actual transfer of the stock. Furthermore, procurement of a
fairness opinion for the transaction did not necessarily indicate that the board
would ultimately accept the transaction.88 Consequently, the Supreme Court
would have had some support had it chosen to allow a deduction for only those
expenditures actually incurred pursuant to the fiduciary duty.89 Also, to buttress
its decision to deny the deduction, the Court could have held that the "dominant
aspect" of the transaction was the transfer of stock, which alone was a sufficient
83. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044.
84. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 77-78 (1989).
85. Id. at 77. Costs incurred to facilitate the transfer of stock are capital by nature and are
nondeductible for that reason alone. See also Jack Wilk & Howell Bramson, Are Takeover Costs
Deductible After National Starch?, 71 J. Tax'n 364, 367-68 (1989).
86. See Wilk & Bramson, supra note 85, at 368 n.13 (citing Locke Manufacturing Cos., 237
F. Supp. 80 (D.C. Conn. 1964)) (proxy contest costs were deductible in defending the corporate
policy against attack by a dissident shareholder); Central Foundry Co.. 49 T.C. 234 (1967) (proxy
fight expenditures for dissident shareholders were deductible under section 162).
87. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 70.
88. See Wilk & Bramson, supra note 85, at 368.
89. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court might have been
correct in affirming the Tax Court's decision because "[t]he line between capital and current expenses
is often a difficult one to draw, and the Courts of Appeals should not overturn decisions of the Tax
Court on this question unless they are 'manifestly wrong."' Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,
475 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing Seas Shipping Co. v. Commissioner. 371 F.2d 528, 532 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943, 87 S. Ct. 2076 (1967)).
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reason to disallow a deduction." With this analysis, the Supreme Court could
have avoided retracting its language from Lincoln Savings that the existence of
future benefits was not controlling.
Taxpayers should have a bright-line test to follow when reporting their taxes.
The Service does not send each taxpayer an annual notice for his tax liability.
The United States employs a self-assessment tax system in which taxpayers
should be able to correctly report their tax liability by applying clear and
understandable rules established by Congress. Particularly for tax matters, the
courts should be available to decide unresolved tax issues and to interpret the
Internal Revenue Code. Courts should not be available, however, to instruct
each taxpayer how he should have reported his taxes during the taxable year.
Thus, when a taxpayer follows the established bright-line tests, he is assured that
his position on the particular tax issue is conservative and reasonable. On the
other hand, when a taxpayer decides to depart from the established bright-line
tests, he is aware that his position is contrary to the general rules and can
anticipate being audited. In other words, bright-line tests allow taxpayers to
choose their own tax fate.9'
Moreover, the Service should also favor a bright-line test, especially one that
is skewed in its favor. For instance, some courts have held that the finding of
an "asset" was a prerequisite to capitalization.92 Since an asset is "flexible and
amorphous," the Service should have remained content with the flexible "asset"
test and simply argued that an asset existed, leaving it to the trier of fact to
decide.93
The Service, however, did not argue to the Tax Court that an "asset" existed;
consequently, the Tax Court did not address whether an "asset" could have
existed in the National Starch case. Thus, the factual conclusion that "no asset
existed" could not be overturned on appeal unless the finding was held to be
"clearly erroneous.""
One commentator suggests that it was possible to find that an "asset" existed
in Indopco.95 Therefore, the expenditures would have been capitalized under
the "separate and distinct asset" test as established in Lincoln Savings.96 He
explains that the "asset" could have been characterized as goodwill or improved
90. See Wilk & Bramson, supra note 85, at 368. Such a holding is comparable to the Tax
Court's treatment of this issue.
91. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 470.
92. See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d 775 and supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
93. The Supreme Court also recognized the flexible and amorphous characteristics of an asset
in Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1045 n.6 (1992).
94. See supra note 77-79 and accompanying text.
95. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 478. The commentator further discusses how the courts
should have characterized the payments as constructive dividends to the shareholders. As such, the
shareholders would have had to report these shareholder-level expenditures as income, while National





corporate structure: "if the court needs an 'asset' to find capitalization, then, all
it needs to say is 'Poof, there is an asset.' It is indeed that simple. '97 If the
Court or the Service (in litigating this issue) had followed this suggestion, then
the Indopco expenditures possibly could have been characterized as capital,
thereby avoiding the necessity of retracting the problematic language in Lincoln
Savings.98
B. The Inconsistent Use of Factual Findings of the Tax Court
The second flaw in the Court's analysis is its inconsistent references to the
Tax Court's findings of fact. In response to the Service's argument that the
expenses were nondeductible because they were incurred incident to a recapital-
ization, merger, or reorganization, the Tax Court made the following factual
findings:
(1) The amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation that changed the
authorized preferred shares from 6,563,000 to 1,000 shares of common
stock was "merely for administrative convenience and simplicity.
Accordingly, it [was] not relevant to the deductibility issue" and not
evidence of recapitalization;
(2) The merger was incidental to the transaction, as supported by the
letter ruling, and did not cause the expenditures to be capital; and
(3) The transaction was not similar to a § 368(a)(1)(B) reorganization
that would have caused the expenditures to be capital."
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit resolved this legal issue by stating that even
though the "Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the transaction
was essentially a reorganization ... [that] does not preclude consideration of
the general rationale behind requiring capitalization of the expenses for
restructuring."lo°  The Third Circuit offered no relevant support for this
conclusion of law, citing instead cases involving reorganizations. On the
contrary, the Third Circuit found that the Tax Court's finding of the long-term
benefits to National Starch was not "clearly erroneous.''
97. Id.
98. On the other hand, creating an asset in this case might have been futile because the costs
capitalized in this particular case were nonamortizable. See Sheppard, supra note 59, at 654.
99. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 74-75 (1989).
100. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 433 (3d Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added). For a further analysis discussing the Tax Court's finding that no reorganization
existed, see Quinn, supra note 24, at 177-79.
101. National Starch, 918 F.2d at 434; see also Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 270,
82 S. Ct. 1277, 1278 (1962); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511
(1985), for a discussion of the "clearly erroneous" standard in tax cases. In National Starch, the
Third Circuit cited General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1964),
written by Justice Blackmun while on the Eighth Circuit, which held that expenses incurred for
issuing nontaxable stock dividends were to be capitalized.
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Addressing this issue, the Supreme Court stated that the expenses "incurred
for the purpose of changing the corporate structure ... are not ordinary and
necessary business expenses."'0 2  The Tax Court, however, had found that
National Starch's business continued as before, with the same directors and
officers and with no changes in the operation or in the acquisition of any
technological or financial assistance; only the ownership of the company
changed." 3 The Supreme Court's findings were contrary to the Tax Court's
factual findings, were unsupported, and, unless the Tax Court's findings were
held to be "clearly erroneous," should not have superseded those of the Tax
Court. In National Starch, because the Tax Court could not find a reorganiza-
tion, merger, restructuring expenditure, or an "asset," the Court explored other
avenues for a rule that would require capitalization of the expenses involved.
°4
Thus, the Court established the "future benefit" test, which would result in
capitalization through the principle of matching expenses with the income they
produce. 105
Furthermore, a reasonable person could have easily reached conclusions
contrary to the Tax Court's factual findings. The Tax Court's holding that the
transaction was in the taxpayer's long-term interests was based on its consider-
ation of several factors:
Because petitioner's directors approved the takeover, they must have
determined that it was in the best interest of [National Starch] and its
shareholders. Second, petitioner's 1978 annual report said that
[National Starch] would benefit from the availability of ... enormous
resources, and.., that [the] affiliation.., would create the opportunity
for "synergy."'06 There is no evidence of an immediate benefit from
the affiliation, but we believe that this is immaterial. The lack of
benefits in the short term does not imply their absence in the long
term .... Third, the very availability of the resources . . . was an
immediate, as well as a long-term benefit because it broadened
petitioner's opportunities.
0 7
102. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1045 (1992) (emphasis added) (quoting
General Bancshares, 326 F.2d at 715). See Quinn, supra note 24, at 177 (discussing the Judgment
on the Merits of the Tax Court decision, the author stated that "the court could find no evidence to
support characterization of the transaction as [a] reorganization" and that "[dlespite rejecting the
characterization of the expenditures as capital expenditures pursuant to a reorganization, the court still
found the expenditures to be capital.").
103. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 71.
104. See Persellin, supra note 38, at 160.
105. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 473.
106. Synergy, from the Greek synergos ("working together"), means combined action or
operation. Schewe, supra note 67, at 147 n.l.
107. National Starch, 93 T.C. at 76 (emphasis added).
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That the directors approved the takeover did not necessarily prove that the
takeover was in the taxpayer's long-term interests. One of the primary incentives
for approving the transaction was the resulting estate tax benefits for the elderly
majority shareholders.'08 This immediate tax benefit for the Greenwalls did not
necessarily indicate that the corporation would receive any correlative benefit.
Another factor indicating National Starch received long-term benefits was
the availability of enormous resources and the opportunity for "synergy." The
court found there was "no evidence of an immediate benefit,"'0 9 but concluded
that this was immaterial. It justified this conclusion by stating that "the lack of
benefits in the short term does not imply their absence in the long term. ' "°
The court did not discuss the possibility that the opposite hypothesis also could
be true: that the lack of benefits in the short term did not necessarily imply their
presence in the long term. Furthermore, the Third Circuit noted that Morgan
Stanley & Co. reported "that the National Starch '[m]anagement also feels that
some synergy may exist with the Unilever organization.. ' ".. The Tax Court
neither found that "synergy" actually existed, nor offered mitigating factors to
explain why such a statement from management could have been made to
Morgan Stanley & Co." 2 Without some other tangible evidence as support,
reasonable reliance on this factor is dubious." 3
Finally, the Court's holding in Indopco did not rely on its decision that an
"asset" was not a prerequisite to capitalization, or on its newly revived reliance
on the "future benefit" test. To the contrary, after citing General Bancshares
Corp. v. Commissioner"4 and other cases which involved reorganizing and
restructuring expenses, the Court held that "[t]he rationale behind these decisions
applies equally to the professional charges at issue in this case .... [T]he
acquisition-related expenses bear the indicia of capital expenditures and are to
be treated as such."" Therefore, it seems that the Court rested its decision on
the foregoing language, even though National Starch did not acquire any property
108. Id. at 69.
109. Id. at 76.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 1990).
112. One reason for the statement by National Starch's directors that "some synergy may exist"
could be that under state law they had a fiduciary duty to take action in the best interests of the
shareholders. If the directors were sued by the shareholders in a derivative lawsuit, their statements
to Morgan Stanley & Co. would be evidence of their intentions to transact in the best interests of the
shareholders. Thus, it was in their self-serving interests to show that there was an "opportunity for
'synergy."' National Starch, 93 T.C. at 76.
113. An example of other tangible evidence would be a pro foria financial statement for the
company providing real evidence of long-term benefits. The court may have overemphasized the
impact of the 1978 annual report, which is often merely a means of advertising to potential
shareholders.
114. 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1964).
115. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039. 1046 (1992). See also Bittker & Eustice,
supra note 45, 5.06, at 5-36 (While the expenses incurred by the target corporation in an
acquisitive reorganization were generally nondeductible, the proper treatment was unclear.).
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or services in the transaction. If the Tax Court had reached these same
conclusions (i.e., that the expenditures were reorganizing or restructuring-related
and should therefore be capitalized), the Court would probably have not granted
certiorari because the issue in Lincoln Savings would not have arisen. This
inconsistent treatment of the Tax Court's factual findings placed the Court in the
awkward position of retracting its statement from Lincoln Savings.
IV. THE IMPACT AND LIMITATIONS OF INDOPCO
The nondeductibility of expenditures has been explained "as a reflection of
the requirement that a taxpayer account for income and deductions in a manner
that clearly reflects his income. ' 16  In determining the tax treatment of
expenditures, sometimes this requirement was substituted for those which
required the creation or enhancement of an asset or that the useful life extend
beyond the current year. For example, applying the latter criteria rigorously
would require the capitalization of several small items, such as minor repairs, an
accountant's pen, a carpenter's screwdriver, and a welder's goggles." 7
However, these expenditures are deductible because the deduction does not
materially distort the reporting of the taxpayer's income.
If the broad holding in Indopco was applied to its full extent, many of these
minor items would require capitalization. "If every cost contributing to the
profits of future periods were to be disallowed, it would be necessary to divide
almost every salary and advertising expense between its immediate impact on the
customer and its contribution to the company's long-lived goodwill."' 8
Therefore, a reasonable and practical application of this rule is essential." 9 In
Lincoln Savings, the Supreme Court recognized this by holding that "the presence
of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not controlling; many
expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable
year."'
120
In applying Indopco to future capitalization cases, the following consider-
ations are relevant:
(1) The Supreme Court resolved the conflict among the circuits and
held that "the fact that the expenditures do not create or enhance a
separate and distinct additional asset is not controlling."'' Therefore,
this factor should not be determinative of the tax treatment of the
expenditures.
116. Gunn, supra note 22, at 452.
117. See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 57, 1 20.4.1, at 20-67 to 20-68.
118. Id. at 20-68.
119. Id.
120. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 403 U.S. 345, 354, 91 S. Ct. 1893, 1899
(1971) (emphasis added).
121. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1046 (1992).
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(2) In affirming the Third Circuit's decision in National Starch, the
Supreme Court tacitly approved of the statement that "the common
characteristic of expenses that have been found to be capital, in fact the
sine qua non of capitalization, is the presence of a not insignificant
future benefit that is more than merely incidental."' 2 The Supreme
Court followed this lead when it stated, "Although the mere presence
of an incidental future benefit-'some future aspect'-may not warrant
capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in
which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determin-
ing whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or
capitalization.' ' 23 Lincoln Savings held that the future benefits were
"not controlling" in that case.
Consequently, the Indopco decision emphasized that Lincoln
Savings did not "prohibit reliance" on the presence of future benefits;
in particular, those expenses having a significant material future benefit
should be capitalized.'24 Thus, if the future benefits produced by an
expenditure were "insignificant" (presumably, in comparison with the
transaction as a whole) and merely "incidental," then Indopco should
not prevent the deduction. Additionally, because capitalization cases are
extremely fact sensitive, in future decisions, although "not controlling,"
a future benefits analysis should be an "undeniably important"'25
factor in the test for capitalization.
(3) As the issue in most of these cases is the "timing" of the deduction,
the possible distortion of the taxpayer's income should also be
considered in making this determination. This focus on the distortion
of the taxpayer's income may be approached either by considering the
distortion on taxpayers in general or on the particular taxpayer
involved.'26
(4) Indopco involved expenditures incurred in a friendly takeover. In
the absence of a clear signal from the Supreme Court, this broad
holding should be limited to the takeover area.'27
Because of the potential impact of this decision, taxpayers will be forced
either to discount anticipated future benefits resulting from their transactions or
to capitalize the expenditures. 28  The following discussion focuses on
122. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added).
123. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044-45.
124. National Starch, 918 F.2d at 431.
125. Indopco, 112 S. Ct. at 1044-45.
126. See Gunn, supra note 22, at 455.
127. This proposition is supported by scholarly opinion. See, e.g., Manca, supra note 3, at 825;
Sheppard, supra note 59, at 655.
128. See Manca, supra note 3, at 815.
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Indopco's uncertain impact on takeover-related expenses (as were incurred in
lndopco), as well as non-takeover related expenses such as repairs, advertising,
section 195 start-up costs, and hazardous waste removal costs.
A. Takeover-Related Expenses
The Indopco decision involved expenses incurred in a friendly takeover.
The Service last addressed these expenses in TAM 91-44-042. 129 According
to this ruling, the nature of the takeover, whether friendly or hostile, was "not
determinative" of the deductibility of the expenditures. 30  However, the
Court's holding that these "anticipated" benefits amounted to a substantial future
benefit, implied that any expenses incurred by acquired corporations in a friendly
takeover involved a substantial future benefit.13' Furthermore, the Court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that the "dominant aspect" of the expenditures
was the fulfillment of the fiduciary duty, even though expenses incurred in
obtaining fairness opinions were generally thought to be deductible because they
were related to the directors' fiduciary duty. Consequently, expenditures of
successful friendly takeovers will be capitalized after Indopco, unless the case
can be distinguished or otherwise limited.13 1
In an attempt to weaken the Indopco holding, an acquired corporation could
separate the costs incurred in fulfillment of its directors' fiduciary duty from the
costs related to the transfer of stock. 33 By incurring these purported "fiduciary
duty" expenses before board approval of the transaction, "a more tenuous nexus
[exists] between the expenditures and any long-term benefits resulting from the
ownership change."' 34 Also, the taxpayer could argue that it did not anticipate
any showing of "synergy.' 35  Even though National Starch had not yet
experienced any signs of synergy, its annual report indicated that the directors
"anticipated" the company to benefit from the "availability of the Unilever
Group's enormous resources.' ' 36 Future taxpayers' success or failure in similar
transactions will depend upon whether the transaction generates synergy and
whether this benefit is "more than insignificant."' 3 7
129. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (July 1, 1991).
130. Id.
131. See Manca, supra note 3, at 817.
132. Unsuccessful friendly takeover expenses are most likely deductible because, generally, they
generate no long-term benefits to the target corporation. Although it may be argued that the target
has received some benefit, it will only be a short-term benefit, as the target remains unprotected from
potential takeovers. See Manca, supra note 3, at 819 n.31.
133. Id. at 817 n.17.
134. Id. at 817 n.20.
135. Four factors should be analyzed to determine whether "synergy" exists: (1) form of the
acquisition or transaction, (2) nature of the target corporation's business operations, (3) nature of the
acquiring entity, and (4) events subsequent to the transaction. Schewe, supra note 67, at 149-50.
136. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 76 (1989).
137. Schewe, supra note 67, at 150. Furthermore, section 338 acquisitions could be
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On the other hand, expenses incurred to defend against a hostile takeover
might continue to be deductible after Indopco.'38  Requiring capitalization
might not be necessary if the target corporation incurred expenses in defending
itself from an outside attack that produced no future benefits to the target
corporation. These expenses were incurred merely to maintain the status quo and
to allow the corporation to continue as a "going concern." By incurring expenses
to ward off a hostile takeover, a corporation does not anticipate future benefits
from synergy, does not transform the corporation, and does not acquire
resources.
139
Expenses incurred to locate a "white knight" were not deductible even before
Indopco because they created a long-term benefit to the corporation. 4 Most
white knights provide target corporations with synergistic benefits, in addition to
protection against future hostile takeover attempts. 4" Therefore, the taxpayer
must rebut the implicit presumption that the benefits flow from the white knight
if it intends to deduct these costs. Nevertheless, if the target is able to separate
the costs incurred to facilitate a takeover by a white knight from expenses
incurred in defending against a hostile takeover, the expenses incurred for the
latter should still be deductible.
By denying any tax benefit for the expenditures incurred in such transac-
tions, Indopco may represent an attempt by the Supreme Court to restrict the
reorganization, merger, and acquisition frenzy of the 1980s. However, National
Starch was a target corporation, and such a restrictive policy aimed directly at
target corporations does not apparently deter acquiring corporations from
locating and taking over target corporations. 4 2 The amounts spent by National
Starch in obtaining a fairness opinion for its shareholders and in evaluating the
offer were nondeductible capitalized expenditures. Denying the deduction of
such expenses discourages directors of corporations from fulfilling their fiduciary
duty to determine that the transaction is in the shareholders' best interest. Also,
that hostile takeover expenses are deductible (in contrast to expenses like those
incurred in the friendly takeover in Indopco) may encourage corporations to
"snarl" at each other-to feign the hostile nature of the transaction to obtain
favorable tax treatment.
distinguished from hidopco because in those situations the acquired corporation does not receive any
long-term benefit since it is subsequently liquidated. I.R.C. § 338 (1988).
138. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990) and Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-44-042 (July 1,
1991).
139. See Manca, supra note 3, at 819.
140. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 90-43-003 (July 9, 1990).
141. See Manca, supra note 3, at 820-21.
142. However, this policy would be furthered in the situation in which both companies initially
sought to merge with each other.
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B. Non-Takeover Related Expenses
1. Repair Versus Replacement
Because of its broad holding, Indopco may preclude deductions for expenses
that generate future benefits and are incurred in transactions not involving
corporate takeovers, such as repairs, advertising, start-up costs, and hazardous
waste removal costs. With respect to the deductibility of expenses incurred to
repair an asset, the law before Indopco seemed to be settled. Treasury
Regulation Section 1.162-4 provides that "incidental repairs which neither
materially add to the value of the property nor appreciably prolong its life, but
keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating condition, may be deducted as an ex-
pense ... .,,t4' Also, Treasury Regulation Section 1.263(a)-2(a) states that
"[t]he cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery and
equipment ... and similar property having a useful life substantially beyond the
taxable year"'" are examples of capital expenditures.
In analyzing repair/replacement cases, one must remember that the issue is
one of fact.145  Any expenditures falling into any of the following categories
must be capitalized:
(1) Expenditures which materially add to the value of property,1
46
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4, 25 Fed. Reg. 11402 (1960).
144. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a), 52 Fed. Reg. 10060 (1987).
145. To repair is to restore to a sound state or to mend, while a replacement
connotes a substitution. A repair is an expenditure for the purpose of keeping
the property in an ordinarily efficient operating condition .... Expenditures
for that purpose are distinguishable from those for replacements, alterations,
improvements, or additions which prolong the life of the property, increase its
value, or make it adaptable to a different use. The one is a maintenance
charge, while the others are additions to capital investment which should not
be applied against current earnings.
Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1926). See also Bittker & Lokken,
supra note 66, 20.4.8, at 20-93.
146. This factor is closely related to the rule requiring capitalization for expenditures which
create or enhance an asset with a useful life beyond the taxable year. For example, in Hotel
Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1950), the court capitalized the costs of carpets,
refrigerators, repairs, and other rehabilitation expenditures incurred to replace a hotel's worn-out
equipment. In capitalizing the expenditures, the court stated that "[s]ome were for repairs of a
permanent nature which materially added to the value of the property and appreciably prolonged its
life as an operating hotel; and others were for replacements of furnishings and equipment having a
useful life in excess of one year." See Lee & Murphy, supra note 21, at 529 (quoting Hotel
Kingkade, 180 F.2d at 312).
Courts have allowed the deduction of major expenditures for unexpected outlays when caused by
casualties, as distinguished from replacing assets that have become obsolete or exhausted from normal
use. See, e.g., Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962) (cement lining of
water pipes deductible to reduce invasion by "aggressive" waters); Midland Empire Packing Co. v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950) (oil-proofing of basement with concrete lining deductible to
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(2) Expenditures which appreciably extend the life of property, 47
(3) Repairs in the nature of replacements,' 48 and
(4) Adaptation to a new or different use. 4 9
On the other hand, incidental repairs or items which maintain the ordinary,
efficient operating condition of property are deductible as repairs. Such repairs
must not be incurred to upgrade the property to ordinary efficient operating
condition, but rather to maintain it in that condition.' 50
Consequently, it is unlikely that Indopco's broad future benefits test will
have a great impact on the test for repair/replacement, given that the pre-Indopco
test also focused on the amount and duration of the future benefits resulting from
the expenditure.
2. Advertising Expenses
Long-term benefits are the main objective when a business incurs advertising
costs. Nevertheless, the Service has continually acquiesced in allowing a
deduction for these costs,"' and Congress has implicitly sanctioned this
deduction by its silence. Treasury Regulation Section 1.162-1(a) provides that
prevent sudden seepage of oil from adjacent oil refinery).
147. In Jones v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 563 (1955), aff'd, 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957), the
court concluded that the expenditures incurred to renovate a historic building in the French Quarter
of New Orleans were capital because they gave the building a new useful life. See also Lee &
Murphy. supra note 21, at 532-33 ("[Tlhe most important fundamental test which may determine the
character of a repair is whether the repair appreciably extends the estimated remaining useful life of
the property ... before the repairs were made."); John B. Cook, Repairs Expense Versus Capital
Expenditures, 13 Tax L. Rev. 231, 235 (1958).
148. The replacement of a roof, floor, or wall has been held to be capital because it is in the
nature of an improvement or a replacement of a major unit. See, e.g., Phillips & Easton Supply Co.
v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 455 (1953); Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A.
599 (1931), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1933); Georgia Car & Locomotive Co.
v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 986 (1925). Other cases focus upon whether a substantial amount of
structural work was done, thereby becoming a replacement or improvement. See Honigman v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1067 (1971), rev'd in part on other grounds, 466 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972).
See also Farmers Creamery Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 879 (1950) (allowing a deduction where
less than half of a wall or floor was replaced).
The primary criterion in these cases was whether a major portion of the property had been
replaced. See Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1958). See
also Lee & Murphy, supra note 21, at 534.
149. The expenditure does not have to result in a separate improvement which renders the
property more valuable as long as the property is adapted for a different use. "The rationale of these
decisions is that the adaptation of a piece of equipment or an entire property to the taxpayer's use
is analogous to a taxpayer's purchase of a new asset, in which event the purchase price must be
capitalized." Lee & Murphy, supra note 21, at 535.
150. See, e.g., Stoeltzing v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1959); Jones v. Commissioner,
24 T.C. 563 (1955), aff'd, 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957).
151. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-031 (May 29, 1981). See also Manca, supra note 3, at 825.
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advertising costs are included in business expenses which are deductible as
"ordinary and necessary expenditures directly connected with or pertaining to the
taxpayer's trade or business."' 52 Treasury Regulation Section 1.162-20(a)(2)
allows for the deductibility of "good will" advertising "which keeps the
taxpayer's name before the public."' 53 As a result, advertising expenses were
deductible, even if "long-term benefits [were] the taxpayer's primary objec-
tive." 1
54
The Service specifically addressed this post-Indopco issue in Revenue Ruling
92-80 and held that Indopco did not affect the deductibility of advertising
costs.' "55 However, this is only the Service's interpretation of Indopco on this
issue. A technical application of Indopco's future benefit test would cause these
expenditures to be capitalized. Nevertheless, taxpayers should continue to deduct
advertising expenses, even though it would be more difficult for taxpayers after
Indopco to overcome their burden of establishing the currently deductible portion
of these expenditures. Assuming the Service "went on the warpath by
disallowing current deductions for advertising, '  taxpayers could lose this
battle, especially if the present benefit was "not [an] insignificant future benefit
that [was] more than merely incidental."'5 However, as long as the regula-
tions and the Service's position remain constant, advertising costs should remain
deductible, despite Indopco.
3. Section 195 Start-Up Costs
The analysis of Indopco's impact on section 195 start-up expenditures is
more complex. Section 195 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no deduction shall be
allowed for start-up expenditures .... Start-up expenditures may be
... treated as deferred expenses ... and prorated equally over such
period of not less than 60 months ...... "[S]tart-up expenditure" means
any amount paid or incurred in connection with investigating ... or
creating an active trade or business ... and which ... would be
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a), 53 Fed. Reg. 9881 (1988) and § 1.162-20(a)(2), 34 Fed. Reg. 835
(1969).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(a)(2), 34 Fed. Reg. 835 (1969).
154. Bittker & Lokken, supra note 66, 1 20.4.5, at 20-88. But see Best Lock Corp. v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1217 (1959) (cost of catalogues with useful life of more than one year must
be capitalized).
155. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-39 I.R.B. 7. Revenue rulings, which are published in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin (I.R.B.), are official interpretations of tax laws by the Service on a specific set of
facts to inform and advise taxpayers. Because they are only interpretations by one party in a lawsuit,
these interpretations should not be given great weight. Furthermore, revenue rulings are not binding
on the courts. See Saltzman, supra note 39, 3.0312], at 320.
156. See Bittker & Lokken, supra note 66, 20.4.5, at 20-87.
157. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
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allowable as a deduction for the taxable year in which paid or in-
curred.15 1
This section is viewed as a codification of Briarcliff Candy Corp. v.
Commissioner."9 In Briarcliff, the Second Circuit held that expenditures must
be capitalized only when they result in the creation of a separate and distinct
additional asset. Despite the future benefits created by these expenditures, the
court held that "expenditures for the protection of an existing investment or the
continuation of an existing business ... are ordinary and necessary within the
meaning of section 162 and not capital in nature.' ' 6 Consequently, that these
expenses did not create an asset under the "separate and distinct asset" test was
the impetus behind section 195 allowing the sixty-month amortization deduction
of these expenses, even though they were intended to generate substantial future
benefits.' 6 ' By denouncing the "separate and distinct asset" test, Indopco
frustrated the predominant rationale for deductibility under section 195.162
The court in NCNB Corp. v. United States 63 held that the costs of
developing branch banks were deductible because the taxpayer was already in the
banking business; the costs not related to specific assets were deductible. The
court further held: "[C]osts incurred in expanding a business are not considered
capital costs unless they meet the Lincoln Savings & Loan 'separate and distinct
additional asset' test. And this test holds whether or not the expenditures have
benefits beyond the current taxation period."' 64
To qualify as start-up expenditures, section 195(c)(1)(B) requires that the
costs be "allowable as a deduction for the taxable year in which paid or
incurred."' 6 15 If the courts no longer rely on the "separate and distinct asset"
test (which was rejected in Indopco) and focus instead on the presence or
absence of future benefits, then start-up costs previously deductible under section
195 would appear to be nondeductible after Indopco. A literal application of
Indopco would seem to result in the capitalization of these expenditures because,
arguably, they generate a "not insignificant future benefit that is more than
merely incidental."'" On the other hand, through the enactment of section
195, Congress sought to correct the unfairness of distorting the taxpayer's
income and to provide an incentive to expand businesses. 67  Therefore,
158. I.R.C. § 195(a)-(c) (1988).
159. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). See George B. Javaras & Todd F. Maynes, Do Briarcliff
Candy and Code Section 195 Stiff National Starch?, 49 Tax Notes 1223, 1227 (Dec. 10, 1990). See
also supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
160. Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 787 (2d Cir. 1973).
161. See Manca, supra note 3, at 823.
162. Id.
163. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).
164. Id. at 291.
165. LR.C. § 195(c)(1)(B) (1988).
166. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1990).
167. See Javaras & Maynes, supra note 159, at 1223.
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because the Indopco Court did not specifically mention section 195 in its
decision, presumably the Court did not intend to abrogate that section. Given
that "income tax deductions are a matter of legislative grace,"' 16 section 195
deductions should continue to be allowable because of the prior congressional
mandate found in the code.
4. Hazardous Waste Removal Costs
Indopco may also have implications in a new area of tax law concerned with
the deductibility of costs incurred in the removal of hazardous waste. 6 9
Considering the high cost of asbestos removal, a significant disparity in one's tax
liability may exist, depending upon whether the costs are treated as a deduction
or capitalized. In TAM 92-40-004,"70 the Service interpreted Indopco to
require capitalization of the costs of replacing asbestos insulation. 7' In
response to state and federal mandates and to maintain the health and safety of
its workers, the corporate taxpayer decided to implement an asbestos abatement
program. The taxpayer had two alternatives to combat the asbestos located in
its manufacturing equipment: (1) continuously monitor and encapsulate in case
the fibers became disturbed, or (2) remove the asbestos insulation completely
from the equipment and replace it with alternative insulation. The taxpayer
chose the latter, more expensive, but more cost-effective alternative. The
taxpayer argued that these expenditures were deductible repairs, while the
Service relied on the future benefits resulting from the "governmental decree in
the replacement of the asbestos insulation ... [and] that the taxpayer's property
has ... been improved because the government, in its infinite wisdom,
demanded the adjustment."' 72
The taxpayer had the support of case law to establish that even the cost of
extensive repair work, (e.g., asbestos removal), could be deducted, provided that
the asset remained in "essentially the same operating condition."'73 In Midland
Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner,74 federal meat inspectors ordered the
taxpayer to either oil-proof its basement or close down its plant after it was
discovered that oil leaking from an adjacent refinery presented a fire hazard to
its plant. Although the Service contended that the expenditures to oil-proof its
basement were capital improvements, the Tax Court held that the costs neither
168. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1043 (1992) (emphasis added).
169. This area's focus is primarily on cases involving extensive repairs. See supra notes 143-
150 and accompanying text.
170. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
171. See Lee A. Sheppard, Is the IRS Abusing Indopco?, 56 Tax Notes 1110 (August 31, 1992).
172. Id. at 1113.
173. Id. at 1111 (citing Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950)
(where in response to Federal meat inspector's threats, the taxpayer oil-proofed his basement where
cured hams were stored and subsequently was allowed to deduct his costs)).
174. 14 T.C. 635 (1950).
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increased the value of the property, nor appreciably extended the life of the
property in comparison to its status before the expenditures.175 Instead, the
costs were incurred merely to maintain the plant operating efficiently. Applying
an analysis similar to the one employed in Indopco, the Midland Empire court
looked at the future benefits generated by these expenditures and concluded that
they were not sufficient to justify capitalization. 76 Therefore, it is unlikely that
the Indopco decision would adversely impact this decision.
Similar to the situation in the TAM, removing the asbestos did not increase
the economic value of the equipment or extend its useful life; 177 rather, it
merely kept the business in efficient operating condition. In fact, the new
insulation was ten percent less efficient than the asbestos.' 7 However, in
requiring the capitalization of these expenditures, the Service emphasized that the
taxpayer now benefitted from "operating efficiencies," such as no longer having
to perform expensive and time-consuming precautions to avoid the asbestos.'
79
In Midland Empire, the Tax Court relied on American Bemberg Corp. v.
Commissioner.'80 In American Bemberg, the taxpayer's plant was damaged
because it was located above a geographic fault. The taxpayer incurred expenses
in drilling through the floor of its plant and filling cavities in the soil to repair
the damages. The Service in American Bemberg (like the drafters of the TAM)
argued that the expenditures resulted in permanent improvements. In concluding
that the expenditures were deductible, the Tax Court considered three factors:
(1) the purpose of the work was not to improve, better, or replace the plant, but
rather to avoid abandoning the plant and to keep it operating efficiently; (2) the
physical nature of the work did not create anything new; and (3) the effect of the
work gave the taxpayer assurance that similar damage would not occur in the
future.'' Future reliance on this second factor might be doubtful in light of
Indopco's rejection of the "separate and distinct additional asset" test. However,
unless the Service has evidence of a "not insignificant future benefit that [was]
more than merely incidental,"' 8 2 hazardous waste removal costs should be
deductible under this reasoning.
Furthermore, in Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Commissioner,'83 the
cost of adding a drainage system had to be capitalized because it was reasonably
175. Id. at 641.
176. However, in light of Indopco, it is uncertain whether the Midland Empire court would refer
to the future benefits as "more than merely incidental."
177. Although the property did not increase in value economically, surely the property was more
marketable after the asbestos had been removed. See Susan C. Duffy, Asbestos Removal Costs May
be Currently Deductible, 70 J. Tax'n 290, 293 (1989).
178. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
179. Id. at 4.
180. 10 T.C. 361 (1948), affd, 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949).
181. See Eric R. Fox & Michael F. Solomon, Who Incurs Environmental Clean-Up Costs-And
Why-May Determine Deductibility, 76 J. Tax'n 12, 13-14 (1992).
182. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1990).
183. 25 T.C. 272, affd. 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1956).
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foreseeable that the lack of such a system would cause water to drain onto
neighboring land. The Tax Court held that the drainage system should have been
part of the original plan and thus would have been capitalized if included in the
original construction. In the TAM, the replacement of the asbestos insulation
was not foreseeable by the taxpayer.
8 4
Despite the above reasons why the Jndopco decision should not result in the
capitalization of hazardous waste removal costs, its broad holding should at the
least be limited and not extended to influence this area; Indopco has "[n]othing
to do with it."' 85 Additionally, if corporations do not receive any tax benefits
in the form of current tax deductions for their efforts, corporations will not be
encouraged to comply amicably with federal environmental regulations that
require expensive remedial measures.
CONCLUSION
Whether an expenditure is capitalized or currently deducted is of great
importance to a taxpayer. Deducting expenses currently from income results in
lower taxable income, and thus a lower tax liability. On the other hand, capital
expenditures generate not current tax savings, but rather deferred tax savings
when these expenditures will be matched with the income they produce.
Properly characterizing major expenditures into these two categories is essential,
as this determination will have a profound effect on both the taxpayer's tax
liability and its immediate cashflow.'
86
Before the Indopco decision, the taxpayer looked to the test found in Lincoln
Savings to determine whether a given expenditure should be deducted or
capitalized. Although circuit courts interpreted this rule differently, the taxpayer
was certain that the determining factor was the creation of a separate and distinct
additional asset. Indopco has certainly caused confusion for taxpayers, because
now they are unsure as to the appropriate test to apply in determining the
deductibility of expenditures-creation of a separate and distinct additional asset
or the presence of a future benefit.
184. Many others between the 1920s and the 1970s, besides the taxpayers in this TAM, have
been liable for not foreseeing the harmful effects of asbestos, which has subsequently resulted in the
need for legislative action. See, e.g., Asbestos Hazard Emergency Act of 1986 (AHERA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2671 (1986). See also Duffy, supra note 177, at 290.
185. See Sheppard, supra note 171, at 1111 (referring to the application of Indopco to this area).
186. The initial outlay for the expenditure will have the same effect on the current cashflow of
the taxpayer, regardless of whether it is capitalized or deducted from income. However, items which
are currently deductible from taxable income produce current tax savings by decreasing the tax
liability, and consequently, more cash remains for the taxpayer to use in the current period. On the
other hand, capitalized expenditures produce tax savings ratably as depreciation or amortization
deductions are allowed to offset taxable income in future periods. Thus, in the current period, the
taxpayer would have a greater tax liability, and less cash on hand, as compared to the situation in
which it was allowed a current deduction.
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Generally, takeover expenses incurred in a friendly takeover, like the
expenses incurred in Indopco, should be capitalized unless the case is distinguish-
able from Indopco. On the other hand, expenses incurred in a hostile takeover
should be deductible, even though the Service in TAM 91-44-042 stated that the
nature of the takeover was not determinative of the deductibility of the
expenditures. Moreover, the Service and the courts should continue to allow
deductions for repairs, advertising, and start-up costs, even though these
expenditures generate future benefits for the taxpayers. However, with respect
to the new issue of the deductibility of hazardous waste removal costs, the
Service seems determined to use Indopco to disallow these deductions, despite
relevant jurisprudence allowing these deductions.
The Service, which has traditionally sought to increase revenues by whatever
means available, appears quite anxious to use Indopco as a windfall to fill its
coffers. However, Congress should not passively look on as corporations, to
maintain current cashflows and positive earnings for their shareholders,
haphazardly respond to federal regulations that demand costly remedial measures.
If the Service continues its current trend of using Indopco as a revenue-enhancer,
either Congress should respond With equitable legislation, or courts should read
Indopco narrowly, limiting it strictly to the takeover area.
John Paul LeBlanc
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